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In Bullough v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIAMOND T UTAH, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
11RA VELERS INDEMNITY COM-
P ANY, a corporation authorized to 
do business in the State of Utah, 
PACIFIC FINANCE, INC., a cor-
poration authorized to do business 
in the State of Utah, 
Defendant-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10951 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Appellant Diamond T Utah, Inc., who is a dealer 
in new and used motor trucks, brought an action against 
Respondent Pacific Finance Corporation, hereinafter call~ 
('(l Pacific, who financed the sale of appellant's trucks 
and in the alternative against Respondent Travelers In-
dPmn ity Company, hereinafter called Travelers, who 
was appellant's insurance carrier, for the value of a truck 
and trailer that had been sold on a conditional sales con-
traet and then repossessed and then stolen back by the 
]lmehaser and subsequently wrecked. 
DISPOSITION IN LO-\VER COURT 
At the pretrial, both respondents made a motion to 
dismiss and the appellant made a motion for a summary 
judgment. It was stipulated by the parties that the 
amended and second amended complaint and the answer 
of the respondents would comprise the issues. However, 
there might be a dispute on the facts which are detailed 
in the amended and second amended complaint. The 
deposition of Oral J. Wilkinson was ordered, published 
and it purportedly contained all agreements upon which 
the appellant relies for recovery together with all other 
agreements which Pacific has in their possession pertain-
ing to this matter and others which the appellant might 
find through discovery. 
The appellant further contends that as far as Pacific 
is concerned that the past dealings and past conduct on 
the part of both the appellant and Pacific will have some 
eff ecit on construing the agreements in question. 
The parties submitted written briefs and after argu-
ing the matter the court granted both Travelers and 
Pacific's motion to dimiss. (R. 39, 56, 94, 37.) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial courts judg-
ment granting the respondents' motion to dismiss and 
the granting of appellant's motion for a summary judg-
ment against Travelers or in the alternative against 
Pacific. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Diamond T Utah, Inc., purchased from Travelers 
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an insurance policy the elate of issue of which was January 
19, HJ(il. This insurance policy provides for the payment 
11J' tlw actual cash vnlue of loss due to collision or upset 
lr>ss $2GO.OO deductible. It also provides that they will 
pay for loss or damage to the automobJes caused by theft, 
larceny, robhery, or pilferage. The property to be covered 
by tlw insurance is set forth in the insurance contract in 
tlw Endorsement No. 4124B: 
It is agreed that such insurance as is afforded by 
the policy applies subject to the following pro-
visions : 1. Property Covered - The policy covers 
automobiles (a) consigned to or owned by the 
insured and held for sale or used in the insured's 
business as an automobile dealer including repair 
se1Tice or as demonstrators, exclusive of auto-
mobiles leased or rented to others, and automobiles 
sold by the insured under bailment lease, condi-
tional sale, purchase agreement, mortgage or other 
encumbrance; (b) held by the insured pending 
delivery after sale, except as to loss for which the 
interest of the purchaser is covered by insurance. 
Automobiles consigned to or owned by the insured 
\Vhich are subject to a trust agreement, bailment 
lease, conditional sale, purchase agreement, mort-
gage or other encumbrances are not covered here-
under unless specifically indicated below: 
Interests and Automobiles Included 
Insured's interest only 
Irnmred's interest and lien-
holder's interest subject to 
loss payable clause 
Consigned automobiles 
subject to loss payable 
f'hmse 
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New Used 
Automobiles Automobiles 
NO YES 
NO NO 
NO NO 
When the policy does not cover all interests, the 
company shall not be liable for a greater propor-
tion of any loss than the amount the interest cov-
ered bears to the value of such automobile at the 
time of loss. 
The Appellant on the 23rd day of January, 1961, sold 
to one David Scott a 1952 Brown with Tranicold Van 
Trailer and a 1953 whirte freight liner tractor, both used. 
This sale was made under a conditional sales contract 
which provides first that the title of said property shall 
not pass to the purchaser until all of the sums due under 
the contract are fully paid in cash and further provides 
that seller may take immediate possession of said prop-
erty without demand if the purchaser defaults in comply-
ing with any of the terms of the agreBment. The contract 
also provides on the back thereof for the assignment of 
the agreement to Pacific, and in the assignment to Pacific 
is found the following language : 
" ... I agree that if the assignee shall repossess 
said property for failure of the purchaser to per-
form any of the conditions of said contract, and 
shall deliver said propBrty to my place of business 
within ninety (90) days after the due date of the 
oldest unpaid installment (excluding p;ckup pay-
ments and time property n•quired to be held for 
leo-al sale where re(1uired by state law) per con-
o ' 'd tract, I will pay the balance remaining- nnder sai 
contract within thirty (30) days after delivery, or 
on demand at election of assignee; but no such 
delivery shall be required to be made to me if ~t 
the time of such repossession I am no longer in 
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t1.1e automobile business or am deemed by the as-
signee to be an unsafe risk, in either of which 
events the assignee shall have full right to sell 
such property m; provided in said contract and I 
will upon demand pay to the assignee all sums 
provided in said contract to be paid by the pur-
chaser after sale. Should the automobile be repos-
::ws:·wd solely as the re::;ult of one acc;dental col-
li:sion of overturning, then I shall be relieved of my 
liability hereunder up to the amount of the cost of 
re1Jairing the damage done by sa d collision or 
overturning only, not to exceed, however, the sound 
value of the property at the time of collision or 
owrturning. I understand that title to said prop-
0rty remains in the assignee until the contract bal-
ance shall be fully pa;d, and I agree that in the 
event of my failure to pay the amounts herein 
agreed to be paid in the event of delivery of sa ·a 
property to my place of business, or in the event 
I am deemed by the assignee to be an unsafe risk, 
then in either event the assigns may take posses-
sion and make sale of the said property as in the 
contract provided .... 
On March 4-, 1958, Diamond T Utah Inc., signed a 
roniinuing unconditional guarantee agreement and agree-
ment to furnish insurance and agreement to furnish own-
l' rsh i p certificate. The continuing unconditional guaran-
tPe agTeernent provides that "I guarantee and will pay 
assignee or holder upon demand all amounts due and to 
hecome due by the terms of said contract ... " The agree-
11wnt to furnish insurance provides that appellant agrees 
wlwre Respondent Pacific does not directly order the in-
snrance coverage that appellant will provide the cover-
agp for the terms of the contract and in the event of a 
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loss occurring due to failure to have such coverage, appel-
lant agrees to repurchase the contract for the net unpaid 
balance. Copies of all of these agreements are attached 
to the deposition of Mr. Oral J. Wilkinson. 
David Scott failed to make payments on the condi- ! 
tional sales contract and let his insurance lapse; on the 1 
16th day of June, 1961, the trailer and tractor were re- ' 
possessed by Pacific at Madison, Wisconsin, and was 
taken to the Chief Auto Parts Body Shop at 1208 East 
Broadway, Madison, Wisconsin, where it was parked, 
locked, and left. Later the purchaser found the truck 
and trailer, gained possession of same, drove it away and 
some time later totally wrecked it. Thereafter, appellant 
placed a claim with Travelers to recover for the loss of 
the truck and trailer. Also thereafter, Pacific deducted 
monies from the appellant held by them in reserve to 
cover the amount due under the contract. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACTUAL 
AGREEMENT AND THE CONDUCT OF THE 
PARTIES, PACIFIC FINANCE, INC., IS LIABLE 
FOR THE LOSS OF THE TRUCK AND TRAILER. 
POINT II 
DIAMOND T UTAH, INC., HAD AN INSURABLE 
INTEREST IN THE UNIT SOLD UNDER THE CON-
DITION AL SALES CONTRACT, THEREFORE, UN-
DER THE TERMS OF THE POLICY, TRAVELERS 
INDEMNITY COMP ANY IS LIABLE FOR THE LOSS 
OF THE TRUCK AND TRAILER. 
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POINT III 
ASSUMING THE POLICY EXCLUDED THE TRUCK 
UNDER THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT 
THEN THE POLICY WAS SUSPENDED DURING 
THE TERM OF THE CONDITION BUT WHEN THE 
TRUCK WAS REPOSSESSED, THE CONDITION NO 
LONGER EXISTED AND THE POLICY WAS RE-
INSTATED AND TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COM-
P ANY WOULD BE LIABLE FOR THE LOSS OF 
THE TRUCK AND TRAILER. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACTUAL 
AGREEMENT AND THE CONDUCT OF THE 
PARTIES, PACIFIC FINANCE, INC., IS LIABLE 
FOR THE LOSS OF THE TRUCK AND TRAILER. 
There are two contracts between the Appellant and 
Pacific. One contract is called an Fnconditional Guaran-
tee Contract. The other contract referred to is an Assign-
ment and Repurchase Agreement. The Unconditional 
Guarantee Contract provides for full recourse against the 
Appellant in any and all circumstances. The Assignment 
and Repurchase Agreement provides that in order for 
Pacific to recover against the appellant when they re-
pos::;es::; a vehicle, that they must deliver the property to 
the apellant within ninety (90) days after due date of the 
oldest unpaid installment. There is then a substantial 
tmcertainty, indefiniteness and ambiguity as to which con-
tract the parties should be bound to. Pacific has by past 
rnnduct always repossessed vehicles for the appellant 
when the contracts were in default and returned the 
vehicles to appellant before demanding recourse on their 
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contract. In the im;tant ease, Pacific repossessed the I 
vehicle, however, they wen' unable to return the vehicle 
I 
because of the fact that it was stolen. ' 
The doctrine of practical construction provides that i 
where the contracting parties demonstrate by their ac-1 
tions that they know what the words mean in the contrart0 1 
governing them, the meaning and intent of the parties I 
should be enforced. This rule can also be invoked ~when l 
the contract is unambiguous as far as the words are con-
cerned, if there is ambiguity between the wording and tlte 
actions of the parties to the contract. This court in llarrl-
inge Cornpany, Inc. 1). Eirnco Corp. 266 P.2d 49-±, -±Utah 
2d 320 stated: 
Further, in the interpretation of the contracts, tlll' 
interpretation given by the parties themsdvcs as 
shown by their acts will be adopted by the court. 
In Bullough v. Smis, 16 Utah 2d 304, -±00 P.2d 20, 
the reasoning of the court as set forth in the headnote: 
Doctrine of practical construction by which con-
duct of parties is evidence of agreement is unavail-
able when contract is unambiguous but conduct of 
parties and an apparent conflict with requirements 
of agreement may create ambiguity required to 
bring doctrine into operation. 
In this case, the court quotes II odges Irrigation Co. v. 
Swan Creek Canal Co., 111 Utah 405, 181P.2d217, 
To warrant the court in according great weight 
to, or adopting, a practical construction by the 
parties, it is necessary and sufficient that earh 
party shall have placed the same construction on 
the contract. While the construction placed by 
one party on his own language in a contract is ~he 
highest evidence of his own intention, the meanmg 
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of the contract cannot be established by the con-
struction placed on it by one of the parties unless 
such interpretation has been made to and relied 
on by the other party, or has been known to and 
acquie·sced in by the other party, ... 
Also quoted is the case of Crestview Cemetary Asso-
ciation v. Diedon, 54 California 2d 744, 356P.2d171, 
This rule of practical construction is predicated on 
the common sense concept that 'actions speak 
louder than words.' Words are frequently but an 
imperfect medium to convey thought and inten-
tion. When the parties to a contract perform un-
der it and demonstrate by their conduct that they 
knew what they were talking about the court 
should enforce their interest. 
Appellants correctly claim that this doctrine of 
practical construction can only be applied when 
the contract is ambiguous, and cannot be used 
when the contract is unambiguous. That is un-
doubtedly a correct general statement of the law. 
But the question involved in such cases is ambigu-
ity to whom. Words frequently mean different 
things to different people. Here the contracting 
parties demonstrated by their actions that they 
knew what the words meant and were intended to 
mean. Thus, even if it be assumed that the words 
standing alone might mean one thing to the mem-
bers of this court, where the parties have demon-
strated by their actions and performance that to 
them the contract meant something quite different, 
the meaning and intent of the parties should be 
enforced. In such a situation the parties by their 
actions have created the 'ambiguity' required to 
bring the rule into operation. If this were not the 
rule the courts would be enforcing one contract 
when both parties have demonstrated ~at. they 
meant and intended the contract to be qmte differ-
ent. 
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If Pacific had llH'ant the uncond tional guarant01, 
contract to be the contract that would govern the rela. 
tions of the parties hereto, there would be no obligation 
to repossess, but the course of action of both parties hai 
been to have Pacific repossess the vehicles and return 
the possession to appellant prior to charging appellant 
under the recourse agreement, and this conduct would 
mean that the parties themselves in interpreting their 
1 
own contracts meant the assignment and repurclme i 
agreement to be the operating agreement. I 
POINT II 
DIAMOND T UTAH, INC., HAD AN INSURABLE 
INTEREST IN THE UNIT SOLD UNDER THE CON-
DITIONAL SALES CONTRACT, THEREFORE, UN-
DER THE TERMS OF THE POLICY, TRAVELERS 
INDEMNITY COMP ANY IS LIABLE FOR THE LOSS 
OF THE TRUCK AND TRAILER. 
If it is determined as a matter of law that the uncon-
ditional guarantee contract takes precedence over the as-
signment and repurchase agreement, then the appellant 
is held under such contract hable to Pacific, under a one 
hundred (100%) percent recourse arrangement for any 
loss to any t111cks that are repossessed by the appellant j 
This brings up the question then of whether or not the ' 
insurance policy covers a vehicle that has been returned 
to the possession of the appellant after being sold under 
a conditional sales contract. For the possession of Pacific 
would be the possession of the appellant for when they 
repossessed the truck, they did so as the agent of the ap-
pellant. The insurance contract itself provides that the 
insured's interest will be insured on used automobiles 
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even though it might have been sold under a conditional 
sales contract if the insured has an interest even if the 
conditional sales contract is in force. But in this case, the 
conditional sales contract had been rescinded by the re-
possession by appellant of the vehicle. See Williston on 
Sales, Volume 3, page 227, Section 579(b). The rule is 
well settled that though a change of possession may ren-
der a policy unenforceable during the time that the pos-
session is changed, if the possession is returned to the 
policy holder, though not enforceable up to that time, 
then said policy is in force as it was before the change 
occurred. See Germania Fire Insur.ance Compa;wy v. Tur-
ley, 167 Ky. 57, 179 SW 1059, Home Fire Insurance Com-
pany v. Chowning, 192 Ky. 327, 233 SW 731. Therefore, 
the policy would cover the insured's interest in the used 
vehicle notwithstanding the fact that it had been sold 
under a conditional sales contract. That leaves the ques-
tion as to whether or not the appellant has an insurable 
interest and the law in regard to this is well settled that 
as long as the insured has an interest where he could 
stand to lose monetarily, that loss is an insurable interest 
and particularly this is true wherein as in this case, there 
is a one hundred ( 100%) percent recourse arrangement. 
See paragraph 21 and 22, Sunderlin on automobile insur-
ance. Union Insurooce Soicety of Canton v. Sudduth, 
103 So. 845, Hassett v. Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Com-
pany, 273 P. 745, Pratt v. Hanover Fire Insurance Com-
pany, 146 A. 763, Fountain v. Importers and Exporters In-
surance Conipany of New Yark, 252 NW 569, Fish v. Con-
nectic1tt Fire Insurance Company, 5 NW 2d 779, 8 .ALR 
2d 1426. 
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The general rule is also well established that insur. 
ance contracts should be interpreted if at all possible in 
favor of the insured against the insurer, generally on the 
grounds that the insurer prepares the contract and it is 
better policy to have the coverage intended. See Sedion 
624 and 625, ·Williston on contracts, 3rd Edition, Volume 
4. Also Corbin on contracts, Section 5-17, Volume 3, page 
176. See Tucker v. New York Life Insurance Company, 
107 Utah 478, 155P.2d173, Stout v. Washington Fire and 
Marine hisu.rance Conipany, 14 Utah 2d 414, 385 P.2d 608. 
Also see Appleman Insurance Law and Pratice, Volume 
13, pagaraph 7 401. 
POINT III 
ASSUMING THE POLICY EXCLUDED THE TRUCK 
UNDER THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT 
THEN THE POLICY WAS SUSPENDED DURING 
THE TERM OF THE CONDITION BUT WHEN THE 
TRUCK WAS REPOSSESSED, THE CONDITION NO 
LONGER EXISTED AND THE POLICY WAS RE-
INSTATED AND TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COM-
P ANY WOULD BE LIABLE FOR THE LOSS OF 
THE TRUCK AND TRAILER. 
At the time the unit was sold and the contract was 
subsequently sold to Pacific, the purchaser had an insur-
ance policy of his own insuring his interest as a condition· 
al purchaser, but during the course of the contract, the 
policy expired. Pacific having complete control of the 
contract at that time had a duty to see that the insurance 
was kept in force for the conditional sales contract spe· 
cifically provides that the seller has the right to place a 
policy of insurance on the vehicle and Pacific stood in 
the place of the seller having purchased the contract. This 
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Pacific has done in past transactions, but failed to do 
here. Appellant has signed an agreement to furnish in-
surance and they fulfilled this agreement by their policy 
with travelers which insured their interest. The question 
arises, if the purchaser had had a policy at the time of 
the accident, would his company have paid off after Pa-
cific elected to consider the contract in default and the 
unit had actually been repossessed and then the purchaser 
illegally took possession of it. It would appear to be out-
side of his policy and under the policy of the Appellant. 
Travelers in their Answer (R. 5) and Memorandum 
of Authorities (R. lOl)makes a big fuss about an aliena-
tion clause in the insurance policy which excludes trucks 
sold under a conditional sales contract. The question 
arises to to what would be the effect if the property is 
sold and then regained by the insured prior to a loss which 
of course are the facts of this case. It has been held by 
the great weight of authority that a conditional sale of in-
sured property is not an alienation but merely suspends 
the risk during the existence of the condition and re-
acquiring of the property by the seller upon the failure of 
the condition revives the risk and entitles the seller to 
all rights possessed by him before the property was trans-
ferred. See 8 Couch on Insurance, Second Edition, Sec-
tions 37 :1075, 37 :1063. 
In the case of Cottingham v. Maryland Motor Car 
Insurance Company, 168 N C259, 84 SE 274, the Court 
reasoned that the general rule from the weight of author-
ities was that the violation of a condition in a policy that 
which works a forfeiture merely suspends the insurance 
during the violation and if the violation is discontinued, 
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and does not exist at the time of a loss, the policy revives 
and the insurance company is liable. See 52 ALR 844, 
Atlas Assurance Conip.any Lt.d. i'. Cottam, 11 SW2d 427. 
CONOLUSION 
In interpreting the contracts either Pacific is the 
owner and responsible for the vehicle at the time of the 
loss or the appellant is the owner. If Pacific has the 
ownership interest when the vehicle was stolen, then they 
are responsible under the terms of the repurchase agree. 
ment requiring them to return the vehicle to appellant 
prior to any liability to them from appellant. If the ap-
pellant has the ownership interest then the vehicle is I 
covered by the insurance policy with the Travelers 
which covers the loss of used vehicles owned by them and 
in that event Travelers is responsible for the loss. 
Even if the clause in the policy did exclude vehicles 
sold under conditional sales contracts, then the coverage 
would have been suspended during the condition, but when 
the vehicles were repossessed, the policy would be rein-
stated. But in no event can the appellant be held respon-
sible for the loss of the vehicle. 
Respectfululy submitted, 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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